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Square Scientists and the Excluded Middle
Cyrus C. M. Mody∗
Abstract. The historiography on American science and technology in the 1970s is still small, yet there
are already three distinct strands of work: studies of countercultural scientists, portrayed as enacting or
advocating ‘groovy’ research; studies of the politically polarized debate pitting conservative and libertarian
‘cornucopianists’ against environmentalists and modelers forecasting resource scarcity; and studies of
the early commercialization of technoscience (e.g., biotechnology) that took off in the 1980s. Left out,
I argue, are a class of ‘square scientists’ with little sympathy for the counterculture, and yet open to
(even eager for) a new kind of science oriented to the same problems activists said they wanted science
to solve: pollution, mass transit, housing, biomedicine, disability technologies, pedagogical machines,
etc. Square scientists at places like NASA and Texas Instruments adapted military-industrial-academic
templates to a wide variety of socially ‘relevant’ topics in the 1970s. Yet square scientists still looked to
the military-industrial complex for allies, rather than to countercultural colleagues. This potential middle
ground remained excluded – contributing, in large part, to the failure of schemes to reorient US R&D to
civilian social problems, and to the invisibility of the squares in today’s historical accounts.
Keywords. Commercialization of research, counterculture, resource scarcity
1. Getting Past 1970
Historians have been interested in postwar American science and technology for quite
some time. Indeed, the outlines of historiography on postwar science were set during
World War Two itself, in Henry DeWolf Smyth’s (1945) Atomic Energy for Military
Purposes and Henry Guerlac’s (1987 [1947]) Radar in World War Two. The weaponization,
bureaucratization and physics-ization of science were already apparent in those real-time
histories (Schwartz, 2008; Dennis, 1994), and continued to be important themes once the
postwar period became an acceptable topic for historians.
Yet for many years the ‘postwar’ period ended in 1970. Many works on Cold War US sci-
ence and technology abruptly stop in the early 1970s (Leslie, 1993; Lowen, 1997; Zachary,
1999; Westwick, 2003; Akera, 2006; Haring, 2006; Lécuyer, 2006). The themes of these
works – Big Science, the military-industrial-complex, the supremacy of physics – were
difficult to sustain past 1970. Since the 1970s, the military-industrial-complex has not dom-
inated American science as it did in the early Cold War, physics has declined in funding and
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influence relative to biology, and Big Science has become harder to fund (Riordan, Hod-
deson and Kolb, 2015). To get past 1970, historians of American science and technology
need new narratives.
Fortunately, in the past decade fascinating histories of science and technology in the
1970s have started to appear. In the next sections I describe three storylines that these
works offer in place of earlier narratives about American postwar science and technology:
countercultural and New Left science and technology; backlash science and the political
polarization of the resource scarcity debate; and commercialized technoscience. These
storylines are emic categories. That is, they are categories that I, as an historian of
post-1970 American science, have derived from studies that my colleagues and I have
actually written. An etic categorization derived by stepping outside the perspective of the
history of science community and positing all possible narratives of post-1970 US science
is beyond my scope. My empirical examples and citations to the literature are somewhat
weighted toward the physical and engineering sciences, but the themes of the storylines I
identify are apparent in histories of the social and life sciences as well. Finally, I only claim
confidence in applying these storylines to the USA, though some of the works I cite take
a more transnational scope. An important topic for future research would be to identify
which aspects of these storylines were specific to the USA, and which were entangled in
global developments (Agar, 2008).
My aim is twofold. First, I identify some anomalies in how these literatures represent
science and technology in the 1970s, and draw connections among these storylines that
have so far been missed. Second, I posit a category of actor – ‘square scientists’ – that is
neglected in the dominant post-1970 storylines. I outline what little the historiography says
about square scientists and sketch what a full-fledged narrative about them might say.
2. Storylines 1 and 2: Counterculture and Resource Scarcity
I will summarize the first two storylines together, since they are entangled in curious ways.
Recent works on countercultural science and technology have captured the field’s – and
public’s – imagination (Turner, 2006; Moore, 2008; Medina, 2011; Kaiser, 2012; Kaiser
and McCray, 2016). There is something deeply appealing about hippie maverick scientists
talking to dolphins and ghosts, taking LSD, bridging science and art. Of course, these
works also make an important argument. Previous generations pictured the counterculture
as an anti-science ‘revolt against reason’, (Richard Lyman, president of Stanford, quoted
in Anonymous, 1971). It is, therefore, eye opening to discover that the counterculture and
New Left were, in fact, enthusiastic about science. Many cutting-edge discoveries of the
past half-century can be traced to people who believed in extrasensory perception, astral
projection and (weirdest of all) Science for the People.
Still, it’s important not to exaggerate the importance or innocence of the counterculture
and New Left. There is some sense in which hippies ‘saved’ physics and LSD begat
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Apple and the internet. Yet the counterculture and New Left also left behind many broken
careers when reforms – often chaotic and ad hoc – failed to change ‘the system’. The quest
for a more just science yielded uplifting partnerships forged in the hot tubs of Esalen
(Kripal, 2007) and the Black Panther clinics of Portland (Nelson, 2013). But reformers
also cultivated homicidal and megalomanical allies, from Ira Einhorn to Chairman Mao.
These movements also enraged some unpleasant enemies, from Edward Teller to
Augusto Pinochet. Thus, the second emerging storyline of post-1970 science and tech-
nology (mainly) in the USA explores the polarizing conflict between scientists and engi-
neers aligned with the New Left and those aligned with nascent movement conservatives.
The roots of that divide were varied – Vietnam, nuclear strategy, the supersonic trans-
port, etc. But the core disagreement concerned resource scarcity (Egan, 2007; Badash,
2009; McCray, 2013; Hamblin, 2013; Sabin, 2013; Macekura, 2015). The ideas that earth’s
resources were finite, that a growing human population would accelerate resource exhaus-
tion, and that humans can trigger rapid, catastrophic, global changes were promoted by a
disciplinarily diverse group: from electrical engineer Jay Forrester to ecologist Paul Ehrlich
to astronomer Carl Sagan. In response, ‘cornucopianist’ scientists and engineers from eco-
nomics (Julian Simon) to nanotechnology (Eric Drexler) organized to combat fears of
resource scarcity.
The hard-core scientific cornucopianists, though, were physicists. The modern environ-
mental movement emerged from nuclear testing controversies in the 1950s (Lutts, 1985).
Thus, the discipline that claimed credit for nuclear weapons also yielded the most vocifer-
ous critics of environmentalism. Conservative physicists – many associated with Edward
Teller and Frederick Seitz – mobilized across a range of controversies (Oreskes and
Conway, 2010): anti-ballistic missile defense (for it); the ozone hole and acid rain (don’t
worry); nuclear winter (couldn’t happen); global warming (bad science); cigarettes and
cancer (smoke ‘em if you got ‘em).
3. Anomalies
The literatures on countercultural science and the resource scarcity debate are recent
enough that some obvious questions have yet to be addressed. I would point out
two such anomalies in particular. First, not all Cold Warrior scientists and engineers
sided with Teller. Even some co-inventors of the hydrogen bomb and the nuclear
weapons complex – Harold Brown, Herbert York, Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin – were
scathing critics of anti-ballistic missile defense (Slayton, 2013). Bethe, and even more
Garwin, were champions of socially responsible, societally engaged research. The
scientists most visibly opposed to nuclear testing were Linus Pauling and Barry Com-
moner – future leaders in the peace and environmental movements but deeply embedded
in the military-industrial-complex before the mid-1950s. Carl Sagan, the most prominent
scientist associated with the nuclear winter hypothesis, was similarly supported by the
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military before the mid-1960s. Even Noam Chomsky received military funding through
the early 1960s (Harris, 1974). If everyone started out allied with the military, why did
some move left and some right in the late 1960s? The answer advanced so far is unsatisfy-
ing: Seitz et al. felt betrayed by their colleagues over Vietnam. So why did their colleagues
‘betray’ them?
My second anomaly derives from the obligatory paragraph near the end of books on
countercultural science and technology where it is revealed that the protagonists are, today,
staunch reactionaries. Obviously, the politics of the 1970s were fluid. For example, at
the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, the director, John McCarthy, moved from
red-diaper baby to toxic reactionary conspiracy theorist while his deputy, Les Earnest, ‘who
had worked in government intelligence, would move to the left’ (Markoff, 2009). Still, it
is striking that as the US scientific establishment has become more liberal, many of those
who once challenged that establishment from the left now align with the American right.
Indeed, anti-Establishment scientists have even adopted the technoscientific imaginaries
of conservative cornucopianists. Cornucopianists like Teller were sure humans couldn’t
run out of resources or destroy the environment because innovation could overcome
any resource deficit. They based that belief on their own attempts to weaponize the
environment. They envisioned modifying earth’s atmosphere, oceans, space environment
and even geography, and justified those plans by asserting that free-market nations could
adapt while authoritarian regimes could not. Even thermonuclear war would leave the
earth habitable for capitalists, while anthropogenic climate change would lead to economic
growth!
Perversely, Teller et al. were less optimistic that democracy could adapt. They routinely
subverted democratic oversight, purged liberal colleagues and supported the overthrow
of democratic regimes (Kirsch, 2005; McMillan, 2005). So it’s perhaps no surprise that
their views have converged with countercultural figures who were similarly unsympathetic
to democracy and similarly confident that innovation would provide. But it is mildly
surprising that both groups have adopted the same technologies and scientific views.
Take nuclear power: readers of the Whole Earth Catalog wanted to leave a small
footprint, but these days Stewart Brand (2010) agrees with the defense establishment
that nuclear energy is a good bet, even if it can poison whole regions. Or, take climate
change: for Freeman Dyson, it seemed a problem when he was counterculture-curious in
the 1970s, but now that he’s a darling of Wired he’s sure it’s not (Brower, 2010). Similarly,
Richard Branson doesn’t think democracy is capable of a solution to climate change, so
why not let billionaires fund exactly the same geoengineering technologies that Teller’s
allies promoted in the early Cold War (Nicholson, 2013)?
Perhaps there’s no anomaly here. As Fred Turner argues, Dr. Strangelove and the hippies
bonded over their dislike of liberal democracy. When the communes collapsed, many
former inhabitants became interested in technologies – space colonies, nuclear power,
the internet – that are actually or potentially catastrophic to the environment (Ensmenger,
2015) and probably poisonous to democracy as well. But if the extremities of the political
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spectrum converged after 1970, what about the center? My guess is, if we want to
understand why groovy scientists moved rightward we need to know more about what
scientists on the center-left and center-right did.
4. Storyline 3: Commercialized Technoscience
We also, I think, need to know more about markets, since that’s where political discourse
moved in the late 1970s and 1980s. Fortunately, the third well-developed storyline
about post-1970 science focuses on commercialization of research. Here, historians of
science are catching up to management scholars, anthropologists, sociologists, economists
and even philosophers (Rabinow, 1996; Mowery et al., 2004; Powell and Owen-Smith,
2004; Murray, 2004; Colyvas, 2007). Much of this work focuses on academic biotech
entrepreneurs, but in fact commercialization of academic research began to increase in
the 1970s across all disciplines from agriculture to music (Mody and Nelson, 2013). Some
scholarship celebrates the heroes of high-tech (Berlin, 2005; Jones, 2005; Hughes, 2011),
while others condemn (Mirowski, 2010).
Curiously, many critics claim commercialization was the consequence of an ‘epochal
break’ in attitudes toward science and technology, possibly in the spring of 1980 (Gibbons
et al., 1994; Ziman, 2000; Forman, 2007; Nordmann, Radder, and Schiemann, 2011),
for which neoliberal economists and their political allies can be blamed. But academic
scientists started turning toward the market around 1970, well before neoliberal policies
had much influence. Paula Stephan (2012) shows that the policies that have been most
deleterious to research were changes in pension schemes and retirement ages enacted
in the 1990s. These shifted money toward older scientists to continue existing research
and away from younger scientists proposing new topics. Neoliberal intellectual property
policies from the 1980s had much less effect. Stephan also quantitatively documents
another important shift, this time in the mid-1960s: science policymakers moved from
viewing universities as sources of personnel to viewing them as sources of discoveries.
Qualitatively, that fits with Glen Asner’s (2006) work on Project HINDSIGHT, Elizabeth
Popp Berman’s (2012) on the ‘market university’, and Hyungsub Choi’s (Mody and Choi,
2013) discovery that ARPA grant officers moved from a personnel-production frame to a
discovery-production frame in evaluating university contracts in the mid-1960s.
Thus, rather than one sudden rupture, economization of science built up from many
small turns that accumulated between roughly 1965 and 1995. One particularly important
turning point has largely been ignored by historians of science: the Japanese government’s
1975 announcement of a crash program in semiconductor manufacturing, which legiti-
mated state intervention in science to boost economic competitiveness in the USA (and,
to some extent, in the UK, France, West Germany and the Netherlands). True neoliberals
would disapprove of such interventions; but, over time, the elevation of economic
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competitiveness considerations that accompanied such interventions reinforced a
neoliberal agenda.
I find Sabel and Zeitlin’s ‘historical alternatives’ approach (Zeitlin, 2007) from business
history useful in understanding the market turn. In their view, organizations continually
experiment with their modes of production, and evaluate their own and competitors’
experiments. There aren’t sudden, totalizing moves from one mode to another; rather a
consensus gradually builds that some experiments work better than others. For American
science, after 1965 the postwar (and especially post-Sputnik) mode of organizing research
became politically and fiscally unsustainable. So organizations experimented with new
modes. Over time a consensus formed that the experiments that worked best brought
academic and corporate research closer to the market. What neoliberal economists and
politicians did was to weed out non-market reforms; but both the market and non-market
reforms were initially experimented with for reasons quite independent of neoliberalism.
Moreover, neoliberals never managed to entirely weed out the early Cold War mode of
research, nor all of the non-market reforms to that mode. Many scientists and engineers still
pursue curiosity-driven and/or public-sector-oriented research with no thought of patenting
or monetizing their work.
Aside from the epochal break/neoliberalism issue, the other great open question about
commercialization is how much it owed to the counterculture. Popular histories, in
particular, cast academic entrepreneurs and high-tech pioneers (Markoff, 2005; Isaacson,
2011) as norm-defying mavericks who subvert the Establishment and therefore have a
natural affinity with the counterculture. Academic historians have been more circumspect,
with the partial exception of Eric Vettel (2006), who argues that New Left demands
that scientists ‘research life not death’ incentivized molecular biologists’ turn toward
biomedical applications which then facilitated their leap into industry.
Nicolas Rasmussen (2014), however, dismisses Vettel’s claims that the ‘spirit of ‘68’
fostered biotech. I’m sympathetic to Rasmussen’s alternative picture of biotech as a
natural evolution of incremental progress within molecular biology. But I also think
Rasmussen throws the baby out with the bathwater. Vettel doesn’t draw a plausible
connection from Vietnam-era unrest to canonical biotech firms like Genentech, Hybritech
or Amgen, but he does capture the countercultural milieu of an earlier firm, Cetus. And his
portrayal of the pressures on scientists to reform – from left and right and from top-down
and bottom-up – helps makes sense of the proliferation of institutional experiments in
American science in the early 1970s, of which the experiments in moving closer to the
market have been the most durable.
That said, the depiction of high-tech and academic entrepreneurs as countercultural
mavericks is too simple. To take a famous example, yes, the personal computer owed
something to Ted Holm’s Computer Lib and Steve Jobs’ dropping acid – but it owed even
more to rather square electrical engineers and, surprisingly, clinicians (November, 2012).
There would be no Apple without fast integrated circuits; the attitude of the people who
produced those circuits was summarized by Gordon Moore of Intel: ‘we are really the
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Pte Ltd
64 C. C. M. Mody
revolutionaries in the world today – not the kids with the long hair and beards who were
wrecking the schools a few years ago’ (in Bylinsky, 1973). Similarly, while some academic
entrepreneurs probably believed they were fighting the Establishment, many others were
what Sonali Shah and Mary Tripsas (2007) call ‘accidental entrepreneurs’. They wandered
toward the market because they liked the challenge of starting a company or didn’t think
there was another way to make their inventions available to – for instance – children
with impaired sight or hearing. Some academic entrepreneurs of the 1970s whom I’ve
encountered were Establishment icons with military haircuts and politics to match. Others
were influenced by the counterculture, but not part of it. As a former associate of one
put it, ‘he wasn’t a hippie but he was relaxed’. The widow of another noted that despite
what might be inferred from his interest in parapsychology, his daily uniform was a black
suit, skinny black tie, and white, short-sleeve, button-down shirt. These were pretty square
people, even if their experiments sometimes put them at odds with the system.
5. Storyline 4: The Science of the Squares
Which brings me to my fourth storyline: the role of – literally – button-down scientists and
engineers in an era of turmoil and experimentation. My label for these people is ‘square
scientists’, a term encompassing people who were not part of the youth counterculture
or New Left, but who also were not part of the backlash. These were scientists and
engineers whose views about alternative lifestyles ranged from curiosity to indifference
to impatience, but who – unlike Fred Seitz and company – weren’t so enraged by the
counterculture or New Left that they sought to burn down the house of science. The term
best fits people who, previously, were deeply embedded in the military-industrial-academic
complex. Some remained so during the 1970s, but many moved permanently away from the
military. Given the demographics of American science then and now, the term is skewed
toward white, straight, middle class, middle-aged men. I’m not trying to rehabilitate the
reputation of this class. Rather, I’m pointing out that most scientists and engineers weren’t
part of the counterculture or the backlash, and that we need storylines about these people
to place the other storylines in context.
There is already a literature on square scientists, but it is invisible as a literature. Edited
volumes, conference panels, co-citation patterns, book reviews, etc. lend visibility to the
storylines on the counterculture, resource scarcity debate, and market turn. As far as
I know, there haven’t been volumes or panels on the squares. Views on what square
scientists did during the 1970s are correspondingly fractured. Some (Kevles, 1978) imply
that Establishment scientists simply accepted a loss of authority and abandoned their
most ambitious plans. Others (Westwick, 2007; Westfall, 2008) describe a science and
engineering community that suffered through the 1970s and was reborn in the Reagan
era. But we also have studies of veterans of the military-industrial-academic complex who
believed that institutions, practices, discoveries, technologies and personnel associated
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with defense R&D should be reoriented to problems of civil society in the 1970s. Jennifer
Light (2003) promoted this thesis in From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and
Urban Problems in Cold War America. Unfortunately, her book hasn’t spawned a literature
the way, say, Fred Turner’s From Counterculture to Cyberculture has. Indeed, the nearest
follow-on to Light’s book is Peter Sachs Collopy’s (2015) history of countercultural video
art – i.e., a bending back to storyline #1.
Conversely, there are works (Lécuyer, 2005) that examine square scientists and engi-
neers in the marketplace – i.e., a bending back to storyline #3 – without ever noticing
that the counterculture existed. These are authors I’m indebted to, yet glossing over the
upheavals in American science and society of the late 1960s and early 1970s is unsatis-
fying. Even if square scientists did not participate in the counterculture, New Left, or the
anti-war and civil rights movements, they did observe what was going on around them
and in many cases changed what they were doing as a result. Some responded by trying
to make themselves hip. For instance, Bell Labs manager Jack Morton brought counter-
cultural ideas about ‘innovation’ into industry (Wisnioski, 2016), while another Bell Labs
engineer, Billy Klüver, partnered with Robert Rauschenberg and other artists (McCray,
2016). Others, such as Stanford applied physicist Calvin Quate, simply rode the wave of
funding as it shifted from defense to socially ‘relevant’ areas like pollution, mass transit,
public housing, biomedicine and disability (Mody, 2012).
Quite a few, though, sincerely re-evaluated their research portfolios and decided that
working on socially relevant topics would bring more personal satisfaction than continuing
to do research funded by the military. Of those, many turned to civilian topics out of
revulsion for the war in Southeast Asia and a dawning realization of science’s complicity
in society’s ills. Here, for instance, is an excerpt from an interview with a Stanford
engineering professor from 1971:
Q. Why do you want to move into the areas that you don’t seem to be able to move into?
A. There are several reasons. First, I think it is possible to get stale by devoting too much of one’s
“creative life” to a relatively narrow specialty as I sometimes feel I have been doing. Second, I think
there is unquestionably a fairly direct relationship between a great deal of my students’ and my
research and military technology applications. Up until 5 or 6 years ago that fact didn’t bother me
very much and I was satisfied that the problem seemed to me to have an inherent interest. Today I’m
certainly not as happy as I was then about many aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy and the domination
of the military in the national scene... I would like to find research activity which seems to me to
have a really constructive social potential.1
Yet it’s too simple to equate the turn toward social relevance with an inclination to
the anti-war left. In research on Stanford, I’ve found that scientists affiliated with the
center-right were, if anything, more likely to broaden their research portfolios than those on
the center-left. Outside academia, the political valence of social relevance was even more
confused. Aerospace companies rebranded as public transportation specialists, and nuclear
weapons laboratories retooled to improve public housing. Take, for instance, NASA’s
Manned [sic] Spacecraft Center in Houston (today the Johnson Space Center). JSC was
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traditionally one of NASA’s more politically conservative field sites, due to its Southern
location and connection to the all-military astronaut corps. With the end of Apollo, though,
the Nixon administration pressured JSC into collaborating with the Department of Housing
and Urban Development to produce cheaper, more energy-efficient utility systems for
multifamily housing – yet most engineers in that project welcomed what they considered
an intellectually stimulating challenge. Moreover, that top-down project was accompanied
by a host of bottom-up essays into ‘public sector’ research: adapting the lunar rover for
use by quadriplegics, working with public health officials in New Mexico to deliver better
health care to Native American reservations, collaborating with medical faculty and social
services agencies in Texas to feed people too poor and/or elderly to purchase food at a
supermarket. These projects evaporated with the launch of the space shuttle and the Reagan
administration’s interest in commercializing space – but for a few years in the 1970s, even
as square an organization as JSC was committed to socially relevant R&D (Figure 1).
Or take the co-inventor of the integrated circuit, Jack Kilby. It’s hard to imagine a
more square scientist than Kilby – deeply patriotic, a veteran, a suburban white, straight
Texan. His biography quotes Kilby’s self-narrative thus: ‘I grew up among the industrious
descendants of the western settlers of the American Great Plains’ (in Millis, 2008, p. 5).
Another anecdote indicates his politics: ‘like so many Texans, Jack didn’t like [Bill]
Clinton’ (Millis, 2008, p. 91). Yet, when Kilby became an independent inventor in 1970, the
technologies that most drew his attention were educational machines (a technology beloved
by the Bay Area counterculture, too) and, above all, solar power. Indeed, Kilby spent the
remainder of his career championing solar power, and the rest of his life embittered that
Texas Instruments kept his solar power inventions off the market.
6. The Excluded Middle
Further research is needed to know how representative Kilby and NASA were. Their
importance, however, is easier to see. Kilby was an influential pillar of the defense estab-
lishment and future Nobel laureate. NASA was a global brand which absorbed almost 4.5%
of the annual federal budget in the mid-1960s. As such, they cast new light on the other
literatures I’ve surveyed. With respect to Storyline #1, these examples show that ‘coun-
tercultural’ science was not exclusive to the counterculture. Much ‘groovy’ science of the
1970s looked just like non-groovy science. We need to reevaluate countercultural science
in light of what the squares were doing. Maybe there was some specifically countercul-
tural science, but there were also structural factors that encouraged everyone – hippies and
squares, hawks and doves – to modify their research in similar ways.
With respect to Storyline #2, these examples suggest reconsideration of the polarized
politics of science and resource scarcity in the 1970s. Works in Storyline #2 emphasize
the zealotry of their protagonists. To be sure, there were moments – particularly from the
summer of 1968 through the spring of 1969 – when the American scientific community
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Fig. 1. Cover of the final report of the Meal System for the Elderly project carried out by NASA Johnson
Space Center in collaboration with the University of Texas, Martin Marietta, and a Texas affiliate of Meals
on Wheels. The project took food delivery technologies which had been engineered for astronauts’ use in
space and adapted them for delivery (by mail, volunteer, or social worker) to elderly Texans with limited
ability to leave their homes to buy food.
seemed as likely to break into open warfare as the rest of American society. Yet most of
the scientists I’ve interviewed or encountered in the archives were not zealots. Many were
uncomfortable with or annoyed by those they disagreed with, but few sought to purge
them – at first. Kilby, for instance, grudgingly engaged with the solar energy community,
with whom he had little in common – though after Reagan was elected Kilby told the new
administration that all the Department of Energy’s solar experts should be fired.
Similarly, the National Research Council panel that advised the Department of Energy
from 1975 to 1977 on how to organize its new Solar Energy Research Institute included
Bill Nierenberg and Frederick Seitz – two of the ‘merchants of doubt’ whom Oreskes
and Conway describe as conspiring to undermine the scientific consensus on smoking,
acid rain, ozone depletion, strategic defense, nuclear winter and global warming. It’s
surprising, then, that they would aid the formation of a federal solar energy facility. The
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eight-member panel also included Edward Ginzton of Stanford and Richard Garwin of
IBM. Garwin’s center-left reputation I’ve alluded to; Ginzton’s leanings were possibly
even further left given his friendship with the theosophists, socialists, union organizers
and pacifists affiliated with his old firm, Varian Associates (Lécuyer, 2006). Yet I’ve seen
no indication the Solar Energy Research Institute committee was polarized in the way
Storyline #2 might suggest – though given the Reagan administration’s decimation of
SERI in the 1980s, cornucopianist antipathy toward the institute must have arisen later.
The closure of SERI also offers a clue to reassessing Storyline #3. Works on commer-
cialized technoscience argue something important happened in 1980. But what, exactly?
I believe the significance of that year lies in the winnowing of socially relevant sci-
ence, and in a hardening of attitudes among conservative scientists and engineers. In the
1970s, individuals like Kilby, and institutions like NASA, happily broadened their port-
folios to include aiding the poor and disabled. But over the years, their frustrations with
such projects mounted – they didn’t believe their collaborators were any good, funding
was unpredictable, the people they thought they were helping never seemed grateful or
enthused. So in the 1980s they abandoned social relevance. They didn’t quite return to
early Cold War habits, though. Institutional experiments that brought researchers closer
to the market were preserved. To give an example from NASA: some historians (Jirout,
2015) argue that the Landsat earth observation satellites were an early beachhead within
NASA for neoliberal proposals for commercialization of space. Yet in the 1970s the Land-
sat group at JSC was mostly focused on aiding Native American communities, public
health researchers and environmentalists – i.e., public-sector users, rather than commer-
cial markets. There was no epochal break, only an epochal filter. Landsat spanned 1980,
but Landsat activities oriented to the public interest did not.
Finally, my two examples cue us to examine the ‘excluded middle’. Square scientists
were in the middle of American science in the 1970s: they didn’t participate much in the
counterculture, but weren’t implacably hostile to it. Many squares reformed their research
in the 1970s in small ways and large – becoming more interdisciplinary, less dependent on
the military, more open to a diverse, inclusive laboratory, more interested in using science to
benefit society and the environment. These people have been excluded in the historiography
thus far, in favor of more colorful characters on the left and right.
In part, though, the historiography reflects the middle’s exclusion at the time. Few
people wanted to be seen occupying the middle ground in the 1970s. Jack Kilby, for
instance, wanted solar power to succeed, but he could only imagine collaborating on
solar power with military-industrial allies who preferred nuclear energy. Kilby never
offered environmental justifications for solar power, and he dismissed the technical
competence of those who did. Similarly, individual NASA engineers were intrigued by the
technical challenges of adapting space capsule technology to multifamily housing – but
their employer was adamant that it was a space agency and not an organization dedicated
to solving society’s problems. Square scientists and organizations themselves avoided the
middle ground – which explains why that middle is invisible in today’s historiography.
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I’ve argued here, though, that our understanding of American science in the 1970s will be
muddled if we don’t examine what that middle was up to, and how over time it became a
precarious space to occupy.
NOTE
1. Memo from Stanton Glantz to Stanford Research Committee, 3 March 1971, re: Interview with
Engineering Professor, Stanford University Archives and Special Collections, SU Sponsored Projects
Office records (SC 344 ACCN 1987-130), Box 1, Folder 1.
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